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INTRODUCTION

As if viewed through a prism, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty, has been the subject of varying descriptions by persons viewing it from various perspectives.2 Those who would interpret the
Treaty's provisions for the rest of the world almost invariably adhere
to one of two basic paradigms: the "restrictive" interpretation or its
"broad" counterpart. 3 Proponents of the former include such disparate
parties as Soviet legal scholars,4 members of the Nixon administration, 5
and current U.S. Senators. 6 The latter view is shared almost exclusively by members of the Reagan administration and Reagan era defense specialists.7 The supposed legitimacy of the ABM Treaty as an
1. See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United
States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
2. See generally Sherr, Legal Issues of the "Star Wars" Defense Program, 16 U. TOL. L.
REV. 125 (1984).

3. See Karas, Resolving the "Star Wars"IABM Dispute: May the Source Be With You,
President Reagan, 25 DUQ. L. REV. 677, 677-78 (1984). The position taken by pro-Star Wars
partisans is deemed "broad" because it departs from the "traditional," or "restrictive," interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Ironically, the so-called broad concept narrowly perceives the Treaty
as prohibiting only certain aspects of missile defense, limited in scope and frozen in time. See
infra note 40. In a similar paradox, the restrictive view broadly construes within the Treaty's
ban virtually any tangible manifestation of missile defense. According to the restrictive construction, the only permissible deviation from this blanket ban is that Moscow and Washington, D.C.
may be protected by very basic, earth-based ABM systems, as specifically delineated under a
later-ratified ABM Treaty protocol. See Protocol on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems, July 3, 1974, art. I, 27 U.S.T. 1645, 1648, T.I.A.S. No. 8276.
4. See G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 54-61 (1984).
5. See generally Sherr, supra note 2, at 685-86. Gerard Smith, head of the U.S. delegation
which negotiated the ABM Treaty, and John Rhinelander, a legal advisor with the group, are
strong proponents of the traditional, i.e., restrictive, view.
6. See Karas, supra note 3, at 696. Mr. Karas relates that Senators Nunn and Levin, for
example, view the ABM Treaty restrictively.
7. See, e.g., Furniss, PresidentReagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, 16 U. TOL. L. REV.
149. Mr. Furniss served as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for International Security
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international instrument has been assessed according to each standard. s
Adherents to both positions agree that the ABM Treaty applies
at least peripherally to the "Star Wars" plan.9 However, commentators
have examined the relationship between the ABM Treaty and Star
Wars without seriously exploring deeper implications of international
law.10 Those inclined toward the broad end of the spectrum tend to
fit the ABM Treaty into the Star Wars concept, while those at the
restrictive end fit Star Wars under one or more of the ABM Treaty's
prohibitions." Unfortunately, the resulting diatribes fail to shed light
into that less visible realm of international law beyond the ABM
12
Treaty's text.

To limit assessment of the international legal status of Star Wars
to its comportment with the ABM Treaty may be likened to the fabled
blind man grasping only the elephant's trunk and then confidently
pronouncing the animal a snake. The legitimacy of Star Wars, and of
the ABM Treaty itself,13 must be judged according to general interna-

Policy. Other Reagan team members who have advocated the broad construction are Deputy
National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, Secretary of State George Schultz and Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger. See infra note 85. Interestingly, the Nixon administration predecessors of Mr. Schultz and Mr. Weinberger, William Rogers and Melvin Laird, have unstintingly supported the traditional approach. See Gross, infra note 11, at 36 & 50.
8. See, e.g., Sherr, supra note 2, for an assessment of the traditional ABM Treaty as an
international legal document. See also, Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense
Initiative, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1973 (1986), for an example of a similar, if opposing, assessment
of the "broad" Treaty.
9. Id. As popularly employed, Star Wars refers to the space-based portion of the United
States' ABM program. The more general Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) relates to terrestrialand space-based systems, and thus encompasses Star Wars. The designations are often used
interchangeably, though inaccurately, by the media. This comment focuses on Star Wars to the
exclusion of other SDI systems. For a technical study of SDI and Star Wars technology, see
Fletcher, The Technologiesfor BallisticMissile Defense, 1 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 15 (1984).
10. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 8.
11. See generally Gross, Negotiated Treaty Amendment: The Solution to the SDI-ABM
Conflict, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 31, 32. Mr. Gross indicates that both sides in the Star Wars
debate have "manipulated the Treaty's language and meaning to coincide with their preferred
meaning." Id. He suggests that the Treaty be reconstituted, if necessary, to comprise "an
agreed understanding" between the two superpowers. Id.
12. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 8.
13. Some commentators suggest, as an alternative to the broad ABM Treaty interpretation,
that the U.S. might declare the AMB Treaty void. This contention is generally framed in terms
of the internationally recognized doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. Rebus Sic stantibus represents
the international legal articulation of the doctrine of changed conditions. See, e.g., Goldman,
The Strategic Defense Initiative: Star Wars and Star Laws, 9 Hous. L. REV. 111, 127-30. See
also, infra note 25.
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tional law principles. This comment examines the ABM Treaty and
Star Wars without prismatic distortion, and looks beyond the treaty
to the whole of international law in assessing the program's legality.

II.

HISTORY

In 1969, during the SALT I series of arms-limitation negotiations,
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. engaged in dialogue aimed at curtailing
ABM-related activity. 14 The ABM Treaty thus came to fruition two
years later, and remains in effect today after having weathered the
reigns of nine heads-of-state and occasional avalanches of criticism. 15
Despite the historic tenor of the recent Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty, the ABM Treaty "remains the centerpiece of
the U.S.-Soviet arms control."16
President Ronald Reagan publicly christened the Star Wars concept
as part of a nationally televised speech in March of 1983.17 His predecessors had proposed and even partially implemented rudimentary
ABM systems, but without the explicit intention of nullifying the
threat of nuclear attack.' 8 The president's "Grand Vision"'19 focused on
a space-based network of satellites equipped with exotic weaponry
20
which would literally blow Soviet ballistic missiles out of the sky.
III.

STATUS Quo

The Star Wars controversy that boiled over in the aftermath of
Mr. Reagan's speech has settled to a steady simmer. Opponents of
the plan continue to cite astronomical expense, technical infeasibility,
and outright illegality as reasons to ground the system. 21 From their

14. See, e.g., Jacobson, The Crisis in Arms Control, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1588 (1984) (for
general information regarding arms-related talks between Soviet Russia and the United States).
15. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 13.
16.

Lodal, An Arms Control Agenda, 1 FOREIGN POL'Y 152 (Fall 1988).

17. President'sSpeech on Military Spending and a New Defense, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24,
1983, at 20, col. 1. Mr. Reagan's characterization of Star Wars, and SDI generally, as a means
"to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles" was
perhaps the salient point of the entire speech. Id.
18. Nike-Zeus was Eisenhower's land-based version of Star Wars that literally never got
off the ground. President Johnson briefly considered, and then discarded, various would-be Star
Wars precursors (actually Nike-Zeus offshoots). See Burrows, Ballistic Missile Defense: The
Illusion of Security, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 843, 845-47 (1984).

19. The "Grand Vision" moniker was first applied by Edward Linenthal, apparently in
response to the soaring terms and almost-mystical manner employed by the president in revealing
Star Wars to the American public. E.

LINENTHAL,

SYMBOLIC DEFENSE

14, at n.8 (1989).

20. See President's Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense, supra note 17.
21. See generally Sherr, supra note 2.
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restrictive perspective, Star Wars directly contravenes the substance
and intent of the ABM Treaty, which opponents consider a binding
international agreement. 2 Star Wars proponents argue that any plan
should be vigorously pursued which could prevent "the Big One" from
landing on houses, schools, and people.- Their broad construction of
the ABM Treaty deems Star Wars legal;2 alternately, they interpret
the doctrine of changed conditions as sanctioning the document's abrogation.25
Any attempt at assessing the legality of Star Wars must be predicated upon establishment of the ABM Treaty - the prescriptive instrument most applicable to the program - as legally binding in the
international forum. Similar instruments, somewhat less relevant in
this context, include the Outer Space Treaty, 26 the Moon Treaty,2 and

22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Almond, The StrategicDefense Initiative:What if the United States Terminates
Its Program to Defend Itself?, 16 J. SPACE L. 1 (1988).
24. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 13.
25. Id. at 127-30. Commentators have wielded the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as a
weapon in attempting to pierce the validity of the ABM Treaty by arguing that Soviet transgressions have materially breached the ABM Treaty. According to Goldman and other commentators,
these breaches may have altered the state of relative ABM techno-parity that existed at the
time the ABM Treaty was inked. They suggest that the changed conditions therefore warrant
invocation by the U.S. of rebus sic stantibus to escape unilateral, strategically unfavorable
compliance with ABM Treaty provisions. While Goldman and a number of other commentators
note that Reagan cabinet members Caspar Weinberger and George Schultz repeatedly decried
Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, none have related any official declarations of the ABM
Treaty's outright nullity. See infra note 82.
26. This is the popular designation for the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter Outer
Space Treaty], which itself is the subject of two polemic, uncannily familiar interpretations.
However, the Outer Space Treaty has not generated the intensely divisive debate that the
ABM Treaty has; in fact, even hawkish commentators agree that the Outer Space Treaty at a
minimum forbids stationing ABM-related components on, or in orbit around, the Moon or any
other heavenly bodies. See, e.g., Gallagher, Legal Aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative,
111 MIL. L. REV. 11, 47 (1986). Because no heretofore publicized Star Wars configuration has
been postulated as using a planetary or subplanetary platform, the Outer.Space Treaty's applicability to the Grand Vision is more philosophical than technical.
27. The U.S. is not a signatory to the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, U.N. Doe. A/Res. 34/68. But see infra note
71 (indicating that parties may be bound by international agreements which they have not
expressly ratified). The Moon Treaty is a full-blown, though slightly more restrictive, version
of the Outer Space Treaty's proscription of Moon-related activities. See Goldman, supra note
13, at 119.
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the Nuclear Test Ban.ss Also, any system of missile defense would
seemingly challenge the internationally recognized, if not acclaimed,
doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). 29
Although a complex document, the ABM Treaty is surprisingly
unambiguous. The Treaty's creators presciently appended "Agreed
Statements" to the document in hopes of clarifying those few ostensible
ambiguities within its text. 30 The agreement's stated objective of prohibiting ABM systems in defense of national territory3 at once appears
to dim Star Wars' prospects. Nevertheless, those who have seen the
light of the Grand Vision insist that specific substantive provisions of
the ABM Treaty fail to proscribe development of this anti-ballistic
missile system. 32
The significance of any executed document at once emanates from
its intrinsic wording. 33 The ABM Treaty defines banned ABM systems
as those "currently consisting of" interceptor missiles, launchers, and
radars. 34 Star Wars defenders construe the "currently consisting of"
in Article II as synonymous with "only consisting of."m Their adversaries in the Star Wars debate point to the general tone of the ABM
Treaty's words, modified by ex post facto statements from actual
28. Officially known as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, United States-U.S.S.R., 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No.
543, 480 U.N.T.S. 43, the Test Ban Treaty places a significant but technologically surmountable
obstacle in Star Wars' path. Specifically, Article I of the Test Ban Treaty prohibits the deployment or testing in space of any weapon which derives its potency or power from an atomic
source. Although nuclear-driven ABM systems, which would literally fight fire with fire, occupy
a theoretical niche in the greater Star Wars framework, more "exotic" weaponry, such as
chemically derived lasers and particle beams, form the vanguard of Star Wars hardware. Id.
art. I. See also Fletcher, supra note 9.
29. MAD amounts to a simultaneous mutual-suicide/survival pact between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union, whereby each party is deterred from launching a first-strike nuclear attack on
the other by the threat of automatic retaliation in kind. See Gross, supra note 11, at 693 n.5.
30. See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, supra note 1 (Agreed
Statements).
31. Id. art. I.
32. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 8.
33. A familiar truism states that the effect of any statute, deed, contract, or treaty indeed, any executed, agreed-upon statement of intentions - is to be considered first according
to the document's "four corners." The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an international "summit" convened to thoroughly standardize treaty law, essentially encodified this truism
in Article 31 of its guidelines. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N.
Doe. A/CONF. 39/27.
34. See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, supra note 1, art. II.
35. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 13, at 121-22.

36. See, e.g., G.

SMITH, DOUBLETALK: THE STORY OF

SALT I 344 (1980). As noted, Mr.

Smith served as one of the U.S. negotiators at the ABM Treaty-spawning SALT I talks. See
supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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negotiators 6 in equating "currently consisting of" with "currently consisting of, but not limited to. '37 Other sources of conflict between the
opposing camps are the terms "component," used in Article II of the
Treaty, and "development," in Article V. 8 Pro-Star Wars parties construe the former term to conform with their perception of "currently
consisting of," effectively limiting prohibited components to those
which existed at the time the ABM Treaty was executed. 39 The ABM
Treaty's reference to development, in their estimation, prohibits only
the actual creation of a workable ABM system. 40 By contrast, those
opposed to Star Wars view both "components" and "development" as
41
prospective, open-ended concepts.
According to the Pentagon's own estimation, four of five contemplated stages in the evolution of Star Wars technology explicitly
involve development.42 Another Department of Defense analysis has
revealed that a seminal component of the system unavoidably contravenes the Treaty's ban on ABM-oriented radar. 43 Soviet transgressions likewise may threaten the very existence of the ABM Treaty."4

37. See, e.g., Sherr, supra note 2, at 132.
38. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, supra note 1, arts. II & V.
39. See generally Goldman, supra note 13.
40. Id. Goldman, like many Star Wars supporters, axiomatically suggests that essentially
any activity short of emplacement of a fully operable anti-ballistic missile system is permitted
by the ABM Treaty. See also Furniss, supra note 7, at 150. This belief, like that held by the
same parties limiting applicability of the ABM Treaty to only vintage-1972 weaponry, tends to
trivialize the document. In conjunction, these conceptions effectively render the ABM Treaty
an oxymoron: on the one hand, the agreement supposedly applies only to operational Star Wars
systems, which will not exist until many years in the future; and on the other, it is presumed
to apply only to technology as it existed in the past.
41. See, e.g., Sherr, supra note 2, at 130-35.
42. Id. at 131. Sherr identifies the four stages of development as (1) exploratory, (2) advanced, (3) engineering, and (4) operational systems.
43. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES: AN AsSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 15-16 (1984), reprinted in Gross,
supra note 11, at 31. The crucial task of tracking incoming ballistic missiles by radar necessitates
such an immediate contravention.
44. Recently, the long-harbored suspicions of U.S. observers that the Soviets had violated
the ABM Treaty in constructing a massive radar complex at the interior city of Krasnoyarsk
were substantiated by a rather surprising source: Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.
The Foreign Minister admitted in an October 23, 1989 speech to Soviet legislators that the
installation was, in fact, a violation of the ABM Treaty. General Secretary Gorbachev had
indicated a month earlier that the Soviets would dismantle what he had nevertheless insisted
at that time was Krasnoyarsk's "legal" radar system. See Moscow Says Afghan Role was Illegal
and Immoral; Admits Breaking Arms Pact, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1989, at A1-A4. While the
Soviets' disingenuous denial of the system's existence exacerbated an already-grave infringement
upon treaty rights guaranteed to the U.S., their unprecedented candor must be viewed as a
positive step by all who construe the ABM Treaty a worthy agreement. Far from vindicating
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Yet, if statements by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan are to
4
be believed, the ABM Treaty remains legal and effective. 5
IV.

ANALYSIS

As noted, determination of the legality of Star Wars begins with
consideration of the ABM Treaty, which in turn must be calibrated
as a legal document. Supporters and detractors of the space-based
system concur that the ABM Treaty looms as its largest potential
impediment.46 To be effective as a proscription of law, any enactment
or agreement must be fortified by some degree of enforceability or
47
be accorded general recognition, or both.
In the modern-day international legal forum, recognition is a far
more relevant concept than enforcement.- Enforceability lacks pertinence where treaties are involved, because, unlike commercial contracts, treaties are not subject to meaningful enforcement by some
higher authority.49 Instead, recognition of mutual interests and responsibilities between signatory states forms the essence of any effective
treaty. °
Treaties in general are highly regarded in the international arena;
in fact, they are perceived as singularly well-suited to the task of
instilling legal obligations in states and state-like entities. 51 The United

the opinions of those who hold the ABM Treaty as voidable by the U.S., the Soviets' admission
of fault and subsequent reaffirmation of treaty integrity should reinforce the document. In
addition, the Soviet's actions may stimulate the convening of a Standing Consultative Commission
to clarify the two countries' understandings and expectations. See also, Goldman, supra note
13 and text accompanying note 25. The Soviets have thus doubly bound themselves: even as
their treaty obligations continue unabated, they also have a legal duty to abide by their unilateral
good-faith statement of intent to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk station. See DEPT OF STATE BULL.
No. 2105 (Dec. 1985), at 32-33; see also infra note 82 and accompanying text.
45. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1986, at A12, col. 1. See also President'sSpeech on Military
Spending and a New Defense, supra note 17. In the course of these speeches, the heads-of-state
confirmed their recognition of the ABM Treaty as viable.
46. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 11, at 32. See also, Goldman, supra note 13, at 111.
47. See M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1-7 (1981). For example, the Volstead Act was validly enacted legislation which
nevertheless was never truly part of "the law." Widespread lack of recognition of the technical
prohibition on alcohol consumption rendered enforcement impossible. See D. WALLECHINSKY
& I. WALLACE, THE PEOPLE'S ALMANAC 449-50 (1978). A closer potential analogy is the
Russo-German Mutual Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, which never comprised a bona fide expression of international law because Hitler and Stalin never intended to recognize each other's
interests. See W. CHURCHILL, THE GATHERING STORM 349-52 (1961).
48. See M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 47, at 301-431.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1119-1269.
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Nations (U.N.) bestowed upon treaties official pre-eminence in 1969
by assembling the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 52 From
its inception, though, the U.N. has echoed the long-standing customary
international law principle that treaties are viable legal documents.The U.N.'s own governing instrument, the Charter, includes an
overarching presumption favoring the effectiveness of international
agreements, including treaties. 54 In Article 103, its definitive treaty-related provision, the Charter implicitly maintains that only those
treaties in direct conflict with states' Charter-mandated obligations
will be deemed void.- Incorporating this presumption of validity into
a matrix of customary international law and general contract law
tenets, the U.N.'s Vienna Convention codified substantive standards
and modes of interpretation.5 As a result, any treaty which comports
with Convention-promulgated guidelines shall be considered "legal"
by U.N. reckoning.57
Of course, the U.N.'s General Assembly, which sanctioned the
Vienna Convention, lacks the prescriptive power of such national legislatures as, for example, the British Parliament or the Israeli Knesset. 58
Like treaties, pronouncements by the U.N. and affiliated commissions
derive authority from recognition. Significantly, the Convention's
guidelines have been recognized, and thus validated, throughout the
world. 59 Through the synergistic effect of widespread recognition and
a long legal pedigree, the Vienna framework comprises the legal prescription for gauging the legitimacy of treaties.
Those customary international law precepts reflected in Vienna
Convention provisions include assurances against allowing treaties to

52. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 33.
53. See generally U.N. CHARTER, arts. 102-103.
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 103. Article 103 states: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." Id.
In establishing its own predominance, the Charter in effect presumes that any treaty is valid
which does not conflict with the Charter's own provisions or purpose.
56. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 33.
57. The legality of the Convention itself is confirmed by the U.N. Charter. U.N. CHARTER,
art. 7, 2. This section of the Charter specifies that "such subsidiary organs as may be found
necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter."

58. See M.

McDOUGAL

& W.

REISMAN,

supra note 47.

59. See Gross, supra note 11, at 48. While neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
has formally ratified the Convention's 'treaty on treaties," the document reflects the will of the
general world community. Furthermore, the Convention's guidelines embody principles "well

established in general international law," according to Mr. Gross.
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bind non-parties and against "immoral obligations." 6 Among contract
law canons embodied by Convention guidelines are those rendering
voidable any treaty secured under conditions of unequal bargaining
power, duress, misrepresentation, or mistake.61
Accepting at face value the chief executives' proclamations referred
to previously, as well as comments by other officials, the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. continue to recognize mutually beneficial interests manifested in the ABM Treaty. 62 Therefore, the legality of the agreement
rests upon its validity according to the Vienna Convention. The ABM
Treaty obligates no third-parties - only its signatories, Russia and
the United States. The instrument's avowed purpose of decreasing
the risk of nuclear war's hardly qualifies as an "immoral obligation;"
in fact, no greater moral obligation exists. Despite the protestations
of patriots from both countries, the Soviet Union and the United
States stand on essentially equal footing as bargaining parties.- Not
surprisingly, no reports of duress or executory misrepresentation have
surfaced in the aftermath of the ABM Treaty's signing. The issue of
mistake 65 arguably justifies the broad interpretation of the Treaty,
60. See M. McDoUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 47, at 1175-77. McDougal, a noted
international legal scholar suggests that Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, relating to the
preservation of peremptory norms of general international law, impliedly encompasses these
principles. Id.
61. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Declaration on the Prohibition of
Military, Political, or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties. Also, Articles 48, 49,
51 & 52 apply to claims of mistake, misrepresentation and duress. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, arts. 48, 49, 51 & 52.
62. See, e.g., Moscow Says Afghan Role was Illegal and Immoral; Admits Breaking Arms
Pact, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1989, supra note 44, at A4. Soviet Foreign Minister Schevardnadze
expressed renewed interest in mutual security in the course of his Krasnoyarsk "confession"
speech. See also Baker Seeing in Gorbachev New Opportunityfor Peace, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24,
1989, at A4. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker implicated the same interest in a contemporaneous speech in San Francisco. Persons who nevertheless suggest renunciation of ABM Treaty
obligations by the U.S. based on the rebus sic stantibus doctrine would be well-advised to
review the ABM Treaty's six month notice-of-withdrawal requirement, set forth in Article XV.
Similarly pertinent is Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, which states that Standing Consultative
Commissions, comprised of representatives from both countries, should be empaneled to resolve
disputes as to precise treaty applicability. Conjunctively, these two provisions mandate negotiation priorto unilateral abrogation; that is, neither party can simply opt out of the ABM Treaty
because it thinks the other party is "cheating." See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, supra note 1, arts. XIII & XV.
63. Id. art. I.
64. See generally, Daggett & English, Assessing Soviet Strategic Defense, 1 FOREIGN
POL'Y 129 (Spring 1988).
65. See generally Raffles v. Wichelhaus, Ct. Excheq. (1864), in J. DAWSON, W. HARVEY
& S. HENDERSON, CONTRACTS - CASES AND COMMENTS 353 (1987). The famous Peerless
case typifies the problem of mistake, where no meeting of the minds has occurred. In that
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but neither commentators nor government officials have claimed that
the U.S.S.R. or the U.S. mistakenly agreed to be bound by the ABM
Treaty.
Just as the ABM Treaty falls squarely outside the prohibitions
articulated by the Vienna Convention, it falls precisely within the
positive pronouncements of Article 53, a key Convention promulgation.- The article prefaces treaty validity upon comportment with
peremptory norms of international law.67 In light of its explicit goal
of arms-limitation, the ABM Treaty expressly embodies those norms
which prescribe "minimum order" within the world community.Interestingly, because the U.S. technically is not a party to the
Vienna Convention compact,6 9 U.S. treaties arguably need not pass

Convention muster. This argument collapses, however, under the
weight of general international law, with which the ABM Treaty does
comport, and to which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are unquestionably
subject.7° Also, the very comportment of the ABM Treaty with Convention guidelines may signify acquiescence therein by the two superpowers.71

Establishment of the ABM Treaty as a bona fide legal instrument
does not dispose of the issue of Star Wars' lawfulness. The matter of
alternative interpretations obscures the ABM Treaty's ultimate significance. Under such circumstances, the Vienna agreement provides procedural mechanisms for gleaning treaties' substance. 72 Most notably,

instance, two parties mistakenly made contractual arrangements based on shipment of cargo
aboard the Peerless. Their mistake arose because, unknown to either party, there were two
ships named Peerless plying the merchant seas. Those parties who entertain the broad view of
the ABM Treaty could suggest that U.S. and Soviet negotiators actually entertained distinct
beliefs as to the true significance of the document they were executing. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151-54 (1981).
66. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 33.
67. Id.
68. See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, supra note 1. See also
M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 47, at 1175-76 (for a discussion of peremptory
norms in the international legal order).
69. See Gross, supra note 11, at 48.
70. Id. (Mr. Gross aptly relates that the Convention's Article 31, for instance, conforms
with general international law).
71. As with their good-faith declarations, parties' actions may determine their subsequent
responsibilities in the international legal forum. For example, customary international law, or
compliance therewith, may be established "as a result of reiterated actions of states," according
to a noted Soviet legal scholar. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. See also Tunkin,
Remarks on the JuridicalNature of Customary Norms of International Law, 49 CALIF. L.
REv. 419, 426-29.
72. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 33.
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Article 31 of the agreement appears to vindicate the restrictive that is, anti-Star Wars - interpretation of the ABM Treaty in mandating that a treaty should be read in light of its underlying purpose. 73
According to this simple test, Star Wars by its very nature contravenes
the ABM Treaty. 74 Similarly, resort to "supplementary means of interpretation," is suggested by Article 32 if a treaty's "meaning [is]
ambiguous or obscure. ' 75 As an embodiment of the "shared expectations of parties, ' 76 a treaty is essentially what its creators think it is.
Supplementary testimony of U.S. negotiators who actually helped
create the ABM Treaty unambiguously supports restrictive construction, and not coincidentally condemns Star Wars as illegal. 7 In-depth
analyses of Star Wars according to both broad and traditional ABM
Treaty interpretations span entire commentaries and books. 78
As indicated, however, analysis of Star Wars legitimacy should
not be truncated by comparison to ABM Treaty provisions alone.
Particularly apropos among other international agreements, the Outer
Space Treaty contains no categorical restrictions on the Reagan Grand
Vision.79 Yet, in urging that space be utilized for peaceful purposes,so
the Outer Space Treaty echoes Article I of the ABM Treaty and
implicitly condemns the Star Wars concept.
The principle of good faith,8' long an international legal fixture,
further points to the ultimate illegality of Star Wars. Contrary indications aside, top Reagan aides at last indicated grudging acceptance of
the restrictive ABM Treaty approach as controlling U.S. policy8 2 Of

73. Id. art. 31. This article provides that "[a] Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose." Id.
74. See Smith, Legal Implications of a Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense, 15 CAL.
W.L. REV. 52, 62-63 (1985).
75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 33, art. 32.
76. See M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 47, at 1194.
77. See generally Sherr, supra note 2.
78. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 8.See generally, T. LONGSTRETH, THE IMPACT OF U.S.
AND SOVIET MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS ON THE ABM TREATY (1985).

79. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 26.
80. Id. art. 21.
81. See M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 44, at 37. The Temple of Preah Vihear
case, 1961 I.C.J. 17, highlights the importance of good faith in the international arena. The
International Court of Justice held that "the sole relevant question [where a good faith statement
is at issue] is whether the language employed in any given declaration does reveal a clear
intention." Id.
82. See DEPT OF STATE BULL. No. 2105 (Dec. 1985), at 32-33. In October of 1985, Deputy
National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane asserted that "testing, as well as development [of
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course, they simultaneously insisted on reserving the discretionary
right to construe the ABM Treaty more broadly. s3 Unlike playground
ethics, which allow finger-crossing behind one's back to nullify a good
faith declaration, international law binds parties to unilateral good
faith declarations.
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) utilized this principle
in holding France to its word in the Nuclear Test cases. 5 In issuing
its opinion, the Court deemed the French bound by their statements
that the country would cease atmospheric nuclear testing. 86 Article 94
of the U.N. Charter establishes the competence of the I.C.J. and
obligates parties before the Court to accept its pronouncements. 7 Not
merely a glorified international traffic court, the I.C.J. effectively
prescribes international legal precedents, as well.88
The fundamental legitimacy of any activity which, like Star Wars,
appreciably impacts international affairs, transcends international conventions and courtrooms. Recognized by U.S. courts- and referred
to by the Restatement (Second) of ForeignRelations Law, 9° the standard of "reasonableness" has emerged in the twentieth century as
perhaps the overriding concern of international law.91 Extolled by international legal scholars, 92 whose words are expressly recognized by

Star Wars] are approved and authorized by the Treaty." Id. Comments from the White House
during the same period seemed to indicate a clear policy change afoot. However, later that
month Secretary of State George Schultz indicated at a NATO meeting that the Reagan administration would continue to observe the traditional approach to the ABM Treaty. He added,
though, that the expansive interpretation was nonetheless "fully justified." Id. See also Karas,
supra note 3, at 678-79.
83. Id.
84. See generally M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 47, at 29-44.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. U.N. CHARTER, art. 94.
88. See Reisman, Nullity and Revision, 819-21 (1971), reprinted in M. McDOUGAL & W.
REISMAN, supra note 47, at 1537-38.
89. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (Both cases were
internationally flavored and involved the application of the principle of reasonableness to questions of jurisdiction. Particularly noteworthy is Judge Choy's reference in Timberlane to Professor Kingman Brewster's articulation of the "jurisdictional rule of reason.").
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 321 & 325 (which
refers to good faith as a relevant consideration in matters of international importance).
91. See M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 47, at 15-20, 983 & 1339. Mr. McDougal
variously explores the application of reason, or reasonableness, to freedom of the seas (frequently
analogized to freedom of outer space), self-defense, and, as indicated, where a conflict of laws,
or jurisdictional issue, is implicated. Id.
92. Id.
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the U.N. and the I.C.J. as a primary source of international law,the appropriateness of the reasonableness standard cannot be questioned in a forum where conflict of laws is inevitable.
Is Star Wars accordingly reasonable in the final analysis? A comprehensive answer to this query could occupy volumes. However, a
cursory evaluation of the missile-defense system in the reasonableness
context suggests that it is not. The amenability of converting Star
Wars into an offensive threat immediately tags the system unreasonableA9 Also, in spite of its intrinsic repulsiveness, the MAD policy has
presided over a quarter-century undeniably free from nuclear conflict.
Star Wars represents an outright repudiation of that policy which can
only portend dynamic changes in the current nuclear weapons stalemate. The effect of MAD's demise would be potentially twofold.
Under a best-case scenario, a neurotic arms race could surely ensue
in which nations longing for their former nuclear security blankets
would amass vast numbers of nuclear weapons calculated to overwhelm
an ABM system.9 6 In the alternative, any country having a hair-trigger
grip on its atomic weaponry might be nudged by preliminary development of Star Wars into launching the pre-emptive first-strike. Either
scenario fails the most significant portion of the reasonableness test.

93. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38(1), reprinted in M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra
note 47, at 7 (identifing international conventions, international custom, general principles of
law as recognized by civilized nations, and judicial decisions, in addition to "the teachings of
the most highly qualified Publicists," as bona fide sources of international law).
94. Numerous commentators have recognized the offensive potentialities of Star Wars. See,
e.g., Meredith, The Legality of a High-Technology Missile Defense System: The ABM and Outer
Space Treaties, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 422. As Mr. Meredith suggests, such an offensive
deployment might be specific (e.g., conversion of anti-ballistic missile weaponry into anti-satellite
weaponry) or general (e.g., the use of offensive nuclear weapons against a foe under the assurance
that the foe's own nuclear weapons could not pierce the Star Wars umbrella). Then-Secretary
of Defense Caspar Weinberger ingenuously claimed that the Soviets somehow '"Mow" that the
U.S. will not launch a first-strike nuclear barrage against them. A Weinberger assistant likewise
strongly disavowed the possibility that the U.S. could easily apply Star Wars technology to
offensive weaponry, not on any technical basis, but simply because "offense and aggression are
not the American way." See E. LINENTHAL, supra note 19, at 48. These comments represent
a self-centered, unreasonable approach to world affairs, and yet would probably not be questioned
by the bulk of the American public, who view offense and aggression as decidedly un-American.
Like far too many U.S. officials, Mr. Weinberger and his assistant fail to appreciate that there
are many players and just as many perspectives in the international arena. Additionally, what
Americans somehow "know" is true may not be as clear to a Soviet general or, for that matter,
a Vietnamese peasant.
95. See Gross, supra note 11, at 40-41.
96. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Without question, the idea of ridding the world of the paranoiac
MAD policy is, at heart, a noble one. Unfortunately, in serving to
make that idea reality, Star Wars would leave in MAD's stead a void
of instability. And stability, however tenuous, has been MAD's lone
redeeming feature.
Mere research into the Star Wars concept realistically cannot be
judged contrary to the ABM Treaty.9 Honest assessment of the nearly
impossible task of rebottling the nuclear weapons genie, as well as
lingering chills from the Cold War,9 necessitates a pragmatic approach
to the missile-defense option. Thus, investigation into the theoretical
viability of this option, in the context of continuing dialogue, should
not and obviously will not be ignored by either the Soviet Union or
the United States.
However, unabashed support of the Grand Vision, as exhibited at
times by high-ranking members of the Reagan administration, could
be construed as tantamount to criminal conspiracy in the domestic
legal forum. Development of Star Wars would be not only illegal under
the ABM Treaty and general international law, but practically insane
in view of the unreasonable consequences it quite likely would spawn.And, after all, insanity is no defense in the international legal forum.
Anthony John Mutchler

97. See Furniss, supra note 7, at 150 (quoting Gerard Smith).
98. Despite a record thaw in recent years, the Cold War could re-emerge in the manner
of an ice age from incidents like the recent "lasings" of U.S. aircraft by Soviet sources. See
Laserfirings suspected, Tallahassee Democrat, Nov. 10, 1989, at 1A & 4A. The Pentagon claims
that Soviet marine vessels in the Pacific were responsible for blinding flashes of light aimed at
four U.S. air vessels in late October and early November 1989.
99. A 1983 St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorial warned that the instability resulting from
development of Star Wars would inevitably increase tension between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. Rather poignantly, the article stated: "This is no Star Wars, this is madness." See E.
LINENTHAL, supra note 19, at 14.
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